Though very dynamic, the field is undeniably still far from reaching a maturity phase for several reasons. The first reason is that this field of research is highly multidisciplinary, since it deals with important issues in economics, management, accountability, law, sociology, etc.
In each of these disciplines, one can find key contributions that may illuminate some aspects of corporate governance, although a global vision mixing these various advances into a uniform approach is still missing. Here, connections between disciplines would certainly improve the common understanding of what corporate governance is, and how it functions at the level of the firm and at the more aggregated level of the society. The second reason is that even if we do not consider corporate governance at a co-disciplinary level and only adopt a purely economist vision of the problem -as we will do in this special issue 1 -the debate and potentially the conflicts between alternative theories is pretty intense. Only in few other fields have discussions on formerly accepted assumptions been so harsh, and implications in the real world on how firms are governed so controversial. The third reason is that, again for an economist, the object of study may be captured in many different ways, since corporate governance may apply to several types of firms, have various types of implications at the industry level, and be inserted in different institutional frameworks.
In this special issue, we will argue that the financial crash that occurred in the 2000s has played the role of a 'dividing line' between how corporate governance in advanced economies was understood before this event, at a time where corporate scandals multiplied, and how current debates at the academic and societal levels develop today. The reasons on which we base our arguments are the following. Before the financial crash, the common belief was that the shareholder value model of governance, based on disclosure of information and financial primacy, should be applied to all firms, independently of their age, size, activity, and home country. This belief was grounded on several key academic contributions -we cited the most important ones at the beginning of this introduction. At a practical level, the belief involved that companies changed the composition of their boards of directors and audit committees to achieve a super majority of external members. Companies also tracked systematically charter and bylaw provisions as well as anti-takeover provisions, and increasingly linked the executives and directors compensations with stock market performance. However the whole system went up to overheat in the early 2000s, and the expected virtuous cycle of shareholder value "disclosure of information -financial primacy -realignment of the managers' incentives -higher performance on economic results and stock markets" finally generated vicious outcomes like the emergence of corporate scandals like Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, and more recently Société Générale. Then came the times of criticism of the shareholder value vision and the need for more contextualised models of corporate governance.
Today, the field of corporate governance appears thus as a place where different hypotheses on corporate governance co-exist, though they tend to be supported by highly opponent theories. The stakeholder perspective is the major alternative to the shareholder value perspective. It argues that there are a lot of different parties contributing to the economic performance and value of the firm. Consequently, all these stakeholders, and not only the capital suppliers, have to be considered as residual claimants (Blair, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Kelly et al., 1997; Zingales, 2000; Hansmann, 1996; Driver and Thompson, 2002) . Another set of literature, more concerned with the lack of convergence of systems of corporate governance at the international level, advances the idea that a model of corporate governance -being shareholder value oriented or stakeholder value oriented -can not be considered apart from the institutional context where it is implemented. Indeed, one has to take into account the fact that since the 2000s financial markets are more instable, investors more frequently short termists, and more often in position (because of their size, and sometimes aggressive strategies) to impose their view at the level of the board of directors (Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005; Tylecote, 2007; Allen, 2005; Coffee, 2005; Becht, Jenkinson and Mayer, 2005; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Aoki, 1985) . Finally, some contributions originally coming from the economics of innovation and the economics of the firm showed the model of shareholder value increased the ups and downs that innovative firms and innovative industries faced during and after the financial crash, leading to the conclusion that adopting this model is not neutral and even detrimental in some cases to the evolution of innovative firms and industries (Lazonick, 2007; Fransman, 2004; Ravix, 2005, 2008 ).
Content
The papers presented in this special issue take up the different aspects of the topics raised These five contributions do not exhaust questions from the development of the new economics of corporate governance. However they provide some important guidelines that can structure the future agenda on corporate governance in advanced economies at a time of the post financial crash era.
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